Nonpoint source pollution: An experimental investigation of the Average Pigouvian Tax by Sarr, Hamet et al.
Nonpoint source pollution: An experimental
investigation of the Average Pigouvian Tax
Hamet Sarr, Mohamed Bchir, Francois Cochard, Anne Rozan
To cite this version:
Hamet Sarr, Mohamed Bchir, Francois Cochard, Anne Rozan. Nonpoint source pollution: An
experimental investigation of the Average Pigouvian Tax. 2016. <hal-01375078>
HAL Id: hal-01375078
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-01375078
Submitted on 2 Oct 2016
HAL is a multi-disciplinary open access
archive for the deposit and dissemination of sci-
entific research documents, whether they are pub-
lished or not. The documents may come from
teaching and research institutions in France or
abroad, or from public or private research centers.
L’archive ouverte pluridisciplinaire HAL, est
destine´e au de´poˆt et a` la diffusion de documents
scientifiques de niveau recherche, publie´s ou non,
e´manant des e´tablissements d’enseignement et de
recherche franc¸ais ou e´trangers, des laboratoires
publics ou prive´s.
Working paper No. 2016 –5
C
R
E
S
E 30, avenue de l’Observatoire
25009 Besançon
France
http://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/
The views expressed are those of the authors
and do not necessarily reflect those of CRESE.
N onpoint source pollution:
An experimental investigation
of the Average Pigouvian Tax
Hamet Sarr, Mohamed Ali Bchir, François Cochard
and Anne Rozan
May 2016
 1
Nonpoint source pollution: An experimental investigation of the Average Pigouvian Tax 
 
Sarr H.a,b, Bchir, M.A. a,b, Cochard F.c, Rozan A. a,b 
 
 
Abstract  
 
The “Average Pigouvian Tax” (APT) was proposed by Suter et al. (2008) to reduce the financial burden 
of the standard ambient tax. This instrument consists in a standard ambient tax divided by the number of firms, 
which requires polluters to cooperate in order to achieve the social optimum. To enable polluters to cooperate, 
communication is allowed. We introduce different types of communication: cheap talk, exogenous costly 
communication (communication is imposed), and endogenous costly communication (conducted on a voluntary 
basis after a vote). Our experiment confirms that the instrument induces polluters to reduce their emissions under 
cheap talk. However, we find that group emissions are less reduced when communication is costly. This result 
still holds even when we endogenize communication by introducing a voting phase. 
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Introduction 
The efficiency of ambient taxes (Segerson, 1988) has been experimentally demonstrated 
(Example: Poe et al., 2004; Spraggon, 2002, 2004; Cochard et al. 2005; Vossler et al., 2006; 
Suter et al., 2008; Suter et al., 2009; Cochard and Rozan, 2010; Spraggon and Oxoby, 2010; 
Suter et al., 2010; Vossler et al., 2013; Suter and Vossler, 2014). However, dependence on 
collective pollution levels and potentially very large penalties have justified criticism against 
ambient taxes (Shortle et al., 1998; Shortle and Horan, 2001). As a consequence, the 
implementation of the instrument outside of the laboratory is likely to raise social 
acceptability concerns. To reduce the financial burdens imposed through taxation, Suter et al. 
(2008) proposed the “Average Pigouvian Tax” (APT) which is equal to the standard ambient 
tax divided by the number of firms. Unlike the standard ambient taxes, the specificity of the 
APT implies that the social optimum is not implemented as a Nash equilibrium of the static 
game. To achieve the social optimum, firms are required to behave cooperatively by 
maximizing the joint profit of the group. Suter et al. (2008) found promising results in their 
lab experiment. They tested the APT combined with nonbinding costless communication 
(referred to in the experimental economics literature as “cheap talk”) and showed that the 
instrument successfully achieves high levels of efficiency.  
 
Unfortunately, as promising as these findings may be, other factors may affect the 
enhancement of cooperation thanks to communication. For example, Ostrom et al. (1992) 
show that in the presence of high stake levels of wealth, repeated communication is no longer 
effective in comparison with low levels of wealth. This lack of commitment in 
communication (cheap talk) led other researchers to show that the absence of sanctioning can 
also be detrimental to the effect of communication on cooperation (Ostrom et al., 1992, 
Bochet et al. 2006). In the specific context of ambient pollution, two reasons make us believe 
that another factor is relevant to examine in order to assess the robustness of the APT 
instrument with communication: the cost of communication.  
 
First, communication is likely to be costly in the field because it requires a minimum amount 
of resources, time, and attention.
 
Real life examples where individuals bear the costs of 
organizing meetings and communication mechanisms are numerous. The existence of this 
costly communication is true in general, but even more in the context of farmers who are 
regularly involved in collective actions. For example, in the “coordinated crop rotation”, 
farmers are encouraged to work together to deal with environmental issues, whose resolution 
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requires the commitment of all stakeholders. Another example can be observed in the 
irrigation systems where farmers depend on each other to access water; they need to 
implement coordinated actions to avoid the overuse of water in drought periods. In addition, 
such meetings are not only difficult to organize but also suppose a regular basis of interaction 
(monthly, weekly or daily). Indeed, if one aims to carry on long term projects, these 
communication costs have to be borne repeatedly. In the case of the APT, all these issues of 
organizing the collective action to enhance cooperation will be particularly raised.  
 
A second set of reasons can be found in previous laboratory findings. Prior investigations 
agree to say that implementing a costly communication mechanism significantly decreases the 
number of discussion sessions in comparison to a free communication setting (Ostrom and 
Walker (1989), Isaac and Walker (1991) and Kriss et al. (2011)
1
). Put differently, subjects 
discuss less when there is a costly communication mechanism. In addition, and more 
importantly, there is mixed evidence of the effect of costly communication on cooperation in 
a social dilemma. On the one hand, Ostrom and Walker (1989) showed that whenever we 
introduce costly communication, we observe a decrease in the efficiency of appropriation of a 
Common-Pool Resource (CPR) in comparison to a free communication setting. In their 
experiment, subjects had to provide a provision point collective good with an all-or-nothing 
contribution. Communication is here assimilated to a public good: they can all enjoy 
discussing with other members of the group whenever the public good is provided or not. The 
experiment reveals that costly communication (even with subjects who already experienced 
communication) creates a barrier, and reduces the speed with “which an agreement could be 
reached, and the efficacy of dealing with players who broke an agreement” (Ostrom and 
Walker, 1989). On the other hand, Isaac and Walker (1991) found that costly communication 
is not detrimental to achieve high level of cooperation. In a similar setting, Isaac and Walker 
(1991) examined the provision of a linear public good game after a costly communication 
session. They observed a sustaining of contributions over time and did not observe the 
traditional decay to the zero Nash equilibrium. Particularly, the authors found, in contrast to 
their working hypothesis, that it was possible to fulfill high level of cooperation even when 
subjects frequently fail to provide the communication mechanism. Subjects seemed to become 
more efficient in using the communication mechanism when it was costly than when it was 
free. This same finding was also observed in a coordination game by Kriss et al. (2011).  
                                                 
1
 Costly communication reduces the number of individual messages in a coordination game with costly 
communication.  
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Furthermore, Villamoyr-Tomas et al. (2011) experimentally implemented another mechanism 
of costly communication in a CPR context. In their experiment, only subjects who paid a fee 
could enjoy discussing with each other. The authors introduced the idea of private 
communication. They showed that the setting where communication was provided as a 
collective public good was more effective in lowering extraction than the private provision 
setting of communication. Their experiment revealed that the underlying mechanism of costly 
communication can prove to be relevant in the study of the impact of communication on 
cooperation. 
 
Hence, with respect to all these prior findings, examining costly communication is of interest 
in the case of the ambient pollution and the APT instrument. It is also an open question 
whether costly communication would entail a positive effect (or not) on cooperation for the 
APT instrument. Furthermore, we would like also to point out that the existent experimental 
literature insufficiently addressed the costly dimension of communication and its relation with 
cooperation. Despite the relevance of the issue in real life, we are only aware of these few 
experiments: Ostrom and Walker (1989), Isaac and Walker (1991), and Villamoyr-Tomas et 
al. (2011). Hereafter, we contribute to this literature.  
 
More precisely, the aim of this study is to test the robustness of the improvement of 
cooperation due to communication. This will allow us to examine the robustness of the 
efficiency of the instrument. For that purpose, we answer two questions. The first one 
addresses whether, under costly communication, we observe (or not) a similar convergence to 
the social optimum in the APT instrument as under free communication (Suter et al. 2008). 
The second question is to examine whether the performance of cooperation in the APT 
instrument is dependent on the underlying mechanism that implements the cost in the 
communication. Two forms of costly communication are tested: the case where 
communication phases are imposed, hereafter denoted as exogenous costly communication, 
and the case where communication phases are conducted on a voluntary basis through a vote, 
hereafter denoted as endogenous costly communication.  
 
The endogenous form of costly communication is of particular interest for us. Several studies 
have already shown that endogenous institutional settings (free or costly) yield substantial 
benefits to cooperation (Ostrom et al., 1992; Tyran and Feld, 2006; Kroll et al., 2007; Sutter et 
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al. 2010, Putterman et al., 2011). For example, Sutter et al. (2010) found that giving the 
opportunity to vote in order to determine whether a group would like to provide a public good 
or not, has a significantly positive effect on cooperation. By conferring a feeling of self-
determination, we believe that the endogenous mechanism may balance the costly dimension 
of communication. We therefore test in our experiment a costly mechanism of vote. Two rates 
of costs are implemented: a high cost and a symbolic one.  
 
Our experiment shows that costly communication limits the reduction of polluters’ emissions 
in comparison to a free cheap talk treatment. This result is still verified when we endogenize 
communication by introducing a voting phase in contrast to our expectation. In line with 
previous experimental findings, we verify that introducing a costly dimension significantly 
deteriorates significantly the likelihood of voting for communication phases especially for 
high level of cost. However, we observe that when communication is actually voted, 
emissions are reduced in similar amounts to those in the cheap talk treatment. Finally, our 
experiment reveals that in case of low cost voting phase, the vote prompts the polluter into 
revealing his polluter type: a positive (negative) vote for communication is associated with 
lower (higher) emissions. 
 
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows: the first section presents the theoretical 
model for the experimental study.
 
Section 2 describes the experiment. The experimental 
results are presented in Section 3. The last section concludes. 
 
1. Theoretical model 
n risk-neutral firms whose production activities generate environmental damages are 
considered. Firm i’s (i = 1, ..., n) emission of pollution is denoted as ix . For simplicity, firm 
i’s profit function  ix  is defined with respect to its emissions, and is assumed to be twice 
differentiable, strictly increasing, at a strictly decreasing rate. Ambient pollution is equal to 
total polluters’ emissions 


n
i
ixX
1
. We assume that ambient pollution is not affected by 
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random natural factors
2
 and that the total damage D is a linear function of the ambient 
pollution level X:   XXD   with 0 .  
Without any regulatory policy (i.e. under “laissez-faire”), the firms ignore the damages caused 
by their activities and emit until their marginal net benefits equal zero. That level of emission 
is denoted as 0x . To remedy to this situation, the regulator intervenes with the objective to 
maximize the social welfare  nxxW ,...,1 , defined as the sum of firms’ profits minus the 
damage. It is given by the following relation: 
    


n
i
i
n
i
in xxxxW
11
1,...,  .  1  
 
The level of emission of each firm *ix  that maximizes social welfare is determined by solving 
the following first order condition (FOC): 
   *' ix .  2  
As the model is entirely symmetric, we get for all i, ** xxi  . Moreover, 
0* xx  due to the 
strict concavity of the profit function. 
 
Achieving the social optimum requires that each firm equalizes its marginal profit to the 
marginal social damage. To realize this goal, the regulator can implement the standard 
ambient tax that was found to be efficient in various experimental studies (e.g. Spraggon, 
2002; Cochard et al. 2005; Suter et al., 2008):
3
 
 
 




*
0
nxXt
XTpt
if
if
*
*
nxX
nxX


. (3) 
The taxation occurs whenever ambient pollution is greater than the socially optimal pollution 
level. Therefore, the profit function of a firm i which is supposed to follow a Cournot-Nash 
behaviour when choosing its emission level, becomes: 
 
 
   




*
,
nxXtx
x
Xx
i
i
ipt


    
if
if
           
*
*
nxX
nxX


. (4) 
If *nxX  , a firm maximizes its profit by emitting ix as close as possible to 
0x . Thus in any 
case, ambient pollution will be driven as high as possible, i.e.
*nxX  . If *nxX  , the 
                                                 
2
 While the introduction of “natural uncertainty” would be more realistic, it would complicate subjects’ behavior 
in the experiment, and could therefore lead to more errors. Experimental studies should start with a simple 
environment and incrementally introduce realistic assumptions whose specific effects can be separated. 
3
 This version may be referred to as the standard ambient tax in comparison with the ambient “tax/subsidy”, 
which is simply equal to    *nxXtXTts  , so that polluters get a subsidy if ambient pollution is below the 
target (i.e. when *nxX  ). 
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dominant strategy for each firm is to emit until its marginal net benefits equal the marginal tax 
rate. 
  txpt *' . (5) 
To implement the social optimum (2) as a dominant Nash equilibrium, the following relation 
must be verified: 
t . (6) 
At the social optimum, the marginal tax rate should be equal to the marginal environmental 
damage.  
There is no asymmetric equilibrium satisfying the condition *nxX  . At any vector of 
asymmetric emissions such as  nxxi , there is at least one firm j which has interest to 
emit more (on the condition that *xx j   due to       *'' xx j ), even at the cost of 
triggering the tax.  Thus, any strategy such as *xxi   is strictly dominated. The game admits 
a unique Nash equilibrium, so that there is no coordination problem. This is probably one of 
the reasons why the instrument was found to be very efficient, both in settings allowing 
communication between participants (e.g. Suter et al. 2008) as well as in settings not allowing 
communication (e.g. Spraggon, 2002; Suter et al. 2008). However, it seems unlikely that such 
an instrument would be feasible in practice because all firms bear the full marginal cost of an 
increase in emission of one of them. 
The charges incurred by each polluter can however be limited by relaxing the hypothesis 
according to which polluters follow a Cournot-Nash behaviour when choosing their emission 
level. This hypothesis fails to internalize cross-effects among agents. By considering a 
situation in which a group of polluters might cooperate by coordinating their individual 
emissions choices in order to maximize joint profits, Millock and Salanié (2005) showed that 
the optimal policy is to choose a much lower ambient tax than that required in a non-
cooperative group. The regulator needs only to consider the regulation of one agent: the 
polluter group. A tax that is equivalent to the level of the standard tax divided by the number 
of polluters is imposed on each polluter when the socially optimal target is exceeded. Suter et 
al. (2008) refer to this tax as the “Average Pigouvian Tax” (APT). It is given by the following 
relation:  
 
 





*
0
nxX
n
XTapt 
if
if
              
*
*
nxX
nxX


. (7) 
Thus, in equilibrium, 
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 
n
xiapt

 ' . (8) 
The comparison between conditions (2) and (8) shows that social optimum is not 
implemented as a Nash equilibrium of the static game. However, we can verify that the 
cooperative strategy (or fully collusive outcome), which we define as the level of emissions 
that maximizes joint profits, corresponds to the social optimum. Consider the profit sum: 
 
 
       














 .
,
,
**
11
*
1
1
*
1 nxXifnxXxnxX
n
x
nxXifx
Xx
n
i
i
n
i
n
i
i
n
i
in
i
iapt




  (9) 
Clearly, maximizing this joint-profit function with respect to vector (x1, x2, …, xn) results in n 
first-order conditions such that    ix' . Thus, if the firms manage to maximize joint profit, 
then they will comply with the social optimum and the instrument will be efficient.  
 
2. The experiment 
We present hereafter the parametrization of the experiment, the different treatments and the 
practical procedure of the design. 
 
2.1. Theoretical benchmarks 
In the experiment, the profit and damage functions are respectively given by: 
  ,500842 2  xxx  (10) 
  .52XXD    (11) 
Hence, with respect to our group size of 8 players, the tax rate is equal to 6.5. Each subject 
has a dominant strategy to invest 19 tokens under the static game. The maximum profit of the 
entire group (or cooperative strategy) which corresponds to the social optimum is achieved if 
all subjects invest 8 tokens. Using backward induction, the unique sub-game perfect Nash 
equilibrium of the finitely repeated game is to play the non-cooperative strategy in each 
period for each subject. We consider therefore two main theoretical benchmarks (Table 1): the 
static Nash equilibrium (or “non-cooperative” strategy) and the social optimum (fully 
cooperative strategy). It must be noticed that the benchmarks remain identical with or without 
communication. 
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Table 1: Theoretical benchmarks 
 
 Non-cooperative benchmark 
(static Nash equilibrium) 
Cooperative benchmark 
(social optimum)  
Individual investment 19 8 
Group investments 152 64 
Individual payoff 756 1044 
 
The gain at the cooperative outcome for each player is equal to 1044 points. If everyone plays 
the non-cooperative emission level, the gain will be equal to 756. Therefore, the net gain of 
cooperation over one period is equal to 288 points.  
 
2.2. Experimental treatments 
The five treatments of this experiment are shown in Table 2. Each participant takes part in 
only one of them (between-subjects design). 
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Table 2: Experimental design 
 
Treatments Description 
Number 
of 
groups 
Number 
of 
sessions 
NC (No Communication)  No cheap talk throughout the experiment. 4 2 
CT (Cheap Talk) 
Cheap talk at the end of each four periods 
(before the 5
th
, 9
th
, 13
th
, 17
th
 and 21
st
 
periods). 
8 4 
ECC (Exogenous Costly 
Communication) 
Same as treatment CT except that 
communication is costly. The 
communication cost (200 points) is 
deducted from the gain of the period that 
immediately follows the communication 
phase. 
4 2 
HCV (High Cost Vote) 
A communication phase is held after a vote 
when the majority approves it. The cost (of 
communication) to each voter is high (200 
points). Those voting against the 
communication do not bear this cost but the 
discussion is open to them. 
4 2 
LCV (Low Cost Vote) 
Same as treatment HCV except that the cost 
of voting is low (10 points).  
4 2 
 
In the NC treatment, considered as the baseline treatment, there is no communication 
throughout the game. 
In all other treatments, we introduce the opportunity of communication. Hereafter we refer to 
a “communication phase” as a phase in which subjects can communicate with written 
messages that transit through the computer network. All messages are public (no bilateral 
communication).
4
 Subjects can discuss abatement strategies in response to the ambient 
mechanism imposed on them. The communication phases are limited to three minutes. These 
communication phases take place before the 5
th
, 9
th
, 13
th
, 17
th
 and 21
st
 periods.  
In the CT treatment, the communication phase is free. All subjects are involved in the 
communication phase. 
                                                 
4
 Bochet et al. (2006), by comparing three forms of communication as incentives to increase contributions in 
public goods games, found that verbal communication through a chat room was almost as efficient as face-to-
face communication to induce cooperation.  
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In the ECC treatment, the communication phase is subject to a fee of 200. All subjects are 
involved in the communication phase and are obliged to pay the fee. This is why we denote 
this treatment as “Exogenous Costly Communication”.  
In the LCV and HCV treatments, the communication phase is subject to a vote. Hereafter we 
refer to “voting phase” as the phase in which subjects are invited to vote for or against holding 
a communication phase. The following question is asked to each member of the group in the 
voting phase: “would you like to discuss with other members of your group?” When the 
majority (at least five subjects) of the group responds “yes”, a communication phase begins. 
Otherwise, no communication takes place. When the discussion is approved by the majority, 
only those who voted for communication by answering “yes” bear the cost of the discussion 
but all group members can participate in the communication phase. When the majority for a 
discussion is not reached, no one is charged. 
In addition, we consider a high and a low cost level. The cost is low in the LCV treatment 
(cost of 10, i.e. about 3% of the net gain of full cooperation) and high in the HCV treatment 
(cost of 200, i.e. about 70% of the net gain of full cooperation). The communication cost is 
deducted from the gain of the period that directly follows the communication phases. 
 
2.3. Practical procedures 
The experiment was carried out at the BETA laboratory of experimental economics at the 
University of Strasbourg (FRANCE) in 2011. 192 students of different majors were randomly 
selected from a pool of about 1000 subjects. Each session involved 16 subjects. At the 
beginning of the experiment, subjects were randomly assigned to groups in a partner design 
(the composition of the groups remains the same throughout the experiment). The program of 
this experiment has been designed by Kene Boun My with the web platform EconPlay 
(www.econplay.fr). All interactions were fully anonymous. Upon arriving in the laboratory, 
subjects were given a copy of the instructions (Appendix 1). A monitor read aloud the 
instructions to make them common knowledge and informed the participants that before 
starting the experiment, they would be asked to answer a questionnaire to verify their 
understanding of the instructions. Once the questionnaire was filled out and corrected if 
necessary, one trial period was played before the start of the real game. 
 
Subjects played the role of polluting firms but the framing of the experiment was as neutral as 
possible in order to limit uncontrolled psychological effects. Thus there was no use of words 
such as “pollution”. Emissions were represented by the amount of invested tokens. In each 
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period, subjects could invest any integer number of tokens between 0 and 20. A “Decision 
Sheet” showing the earnings from investment for each of the 20 available choices was 
indicated in the instructions. Subjects knew that they faced the same investment function, and 
that their payoff depended on “their own investment” and on the “investment of the group”.  
After each period, subjects were informed of the sum of the invested tokens by the other 
members of their group. The game was repeated over a sequence of 24 periods. Earned points 
were accumulated and converted into euros at the end of the experiment using an announced 
exchange rate. Each session lasted about 1 hour and 15 minutes and subjects earned on 
average 23 euros. 
 
 
3. Results 
 
Hereafter, Results 1 and 2 analyse the level of group emissions with respect to the cost (high 
or low) and the procedure of implementation (exogenous or endogenous). Results 3 and 4 
focus on endogenous communication, and address the relation between the vote and the 
subjects’ emission decisions.  
 
Table 3: Average group emissions per treatment 
 
Treatments 
Social 
optimum 
Static Nash 
Equilibrium 
Average 
emissions (S.D) 
NC 64 152 
110.10 
(23.83) 
CT 64 152 
84.67 
(20.33) 
ECC 64 152 
91.31 
(25.90) 
LCV 64 152 
89.65 
(25.49) 
HCV 64 152 
108.62 
(20.44) 
 
Notes: Standard Deviations are in parentheses. Periods 1 to 4 are excluded from all the analyses since the first 
communication phase takes place between periods 4 and 5. Periods 21 to 24 are not taken into consideration in 
order to rule out end game effects. 
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Figure 1: Average group emissions per treatment  
 
 
 
3.1 Performance of the APT under costly communication  
In this first part, we address the two main concern of this paper. In Result 1 we tackle whether 
costly communication impacts cooperation under the APT in comparison to free 
communication. In Result 2, we address whether implementing an endogenous form of costly 
communication modifies the cooperation level of subjects with respect to the instrument.  
 
Result 1: Communication reduces emissions. This reduction is statistically significant 
when communication is free, but is no longer significant when communication becomes 
costly. 
 
Table 3 reports average group emissions per treatment. It shows that in all treatments average 
emissions lie between the social optimum and the static Nash equilibrium. Table 3 reports that 
emissions are closer to the social optimum in CT (84.67) than in the baseline treatment, NC 
(110.10).  When applying two-tailed Mann–Whitney tests on average emissions per group, we 
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reject the null hypothesis of no difference between NC and CT treatments at the 10% level (p-
value = 0.08, n = 8, m = 4). Table 3 also shows that group emissions under costly 
communication are reduced in comparison to the NC. However, this reduction is lower than 
when communication is free. Two-sided Mann Whitney tests conclude that average emissions 
per group in HCV, LCV and ECC are not significantly different from those noted in NC. 
 
Figure 1 displays for each treatment the average group emissions per period. It provides the 
graphical evidence of the positive impact of cheap talk on cooperation and the limited effect 
of costly communication on cooperation.  Figure 1 also reveals that the impact of 
communication tends to be more pronounced in the periods that immediately follow 
communication phases. The emissions decline just after communication but then tend to 
increase again over time. 
 
A linear panel data regression with random effects explaining the group average confirms our 
previous observations. The framework for this analysis is the following model: 
itiititititit tHCVLCVECCCTE   543210 ,  (12) 
where the dependent variable, itE , is the emissions of group 24,....,1i  at period 20,...,5t ; 
CTit, ECCit, LCVit and HCVit are dummy treatment-specific indicators and the baseline 
treatment NC is the reference treatment. ),0( 2
i
Ni    is an individual-specific random 
effect and ),0( 2 Nit   is a mean zero error term. The model estimation results are 
reported in Table 4. 
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Table 4: Linear panel data regression with random effects explaining group emissions by all 
treatment variables  
     
Variables 
Coefficients 
(p-value)     
 (1)  (2)  (3) (4) 
CT -25.43** -25.43** -25.43** -25.43** 
 (-2.19) (-2.25) (-2.16) (-2.24) 
ECC -18.80  -18.80  
 (-1.40)  (-1.38)  
LCV -20.45 -20.45   
 (-1.53) (-1.57)   
HCV -1.484 -1.484   
 (-0.11) (-0.11)   
t 0.887*** 0.902*** 1.090*** 1.183*** 
 (5.21) (5.05) (5.65) (6.01) 
Intercept 99.02*** 98.83*** 96.48*** 95.32*** 
 (10.21) (10.43) (9.72) (9.92) 
N 
Overall R² 
384 
0.20 
320 
0.23 
256 
0.21 
192 
0.28 
         
Notes: *** Denotes that parameter estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level. p-
values are in parentheses. Various robustness tests were carried out and confirmed these results.
5
 
 
CT is the only treatment in which emissions significantly differ from those observed in the 
baseline treatment (NC). On average, a group reduces its emissions by 25.43 units when the 
ability to communicate freely is granted in comparison to a situation where this possibility 
does not exist. In a “meta-analysis” of experiments conducted on social dilemma games from 
1958 to 1992, Sally (1995) found that communication increases cooperation by approximately 
30% compared to a situation in which it is not implemented.  
                                                 
5
 The model is estimated by using the Generalized Least Squares (GLS). The robustness of the results is tested 
by: first, running estimations based on robust standard errors in order to take into account possible 
heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation problems (estimating the variance-covariance matrix estimator with the 
Huber/White/sandwich, Bootstrap methods); second, by running the regression on individual data clustered by 
groups.  
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The regression also reveals that ECC is not effective in reducing emission while CT 
significantly impacts pollution. This difference is surprising because the CT treatment can 
also be viewed as an externally imposed communication that is free. Put differently, the only 
difference between the CT treatment and the ECC lies in the variation of the cost. This 
observation confirms that the motivation of our paper, examining costly communication on 
cooperation, is a relevant issue. 
Finally, we observe that emissions in all treatments are significantly increasing, indicating 
that the performance of the instrument decreases over time. This is in line with the 
deterioration of cooperation in social dilemma games. 
 
Result 2: Endogenizing communication has no significant impact on group emissions. 
However, endogenizing communication can be effective in reducing emissions when a 
communication phase is actually voted in the group. 
 
For the same level of cost (200 tokens), we test in our design two different forms of 
communications: an exogenous (ECC) and endogenous one (HCV). The comparison between 
these two treatments shows that endogenous costly communication has no significant impact 
on group emissions. This observation could already indirectly be inferred from Result 1. 
Hereafter we provide more direct evidence. However, it is important to note that this 
comparison does not take into account the success of the group in achieving a communication 
session. Isaac and Walker (1991) and Kriss et al. (2011) already showed that in costly 
communication settings, groups communicate less but the impact on cooperation is more 
effective. We conduct therefore an additional analysis and confirm that whenever 
communication actually takes place, endogenous costly communication significantly reduces 
group emissions.  
 
We run a regression in order to compare the exogenous communication (ECC) and the 
endogenous communication treatments which has the same cost (HCV). The framework for 
this analysis is the following model: 
itiitit tHCVE   210 ,  (13) 
where the dependent variable, itE , is the emissions of group 8,....,1i  at period 20,...,5t ; 
HCVit is treatment-specific indicators equal to 0 in the exogenous communication treatment 
(ECC) and 1 in the endogenous communication treatment (HCV). ),0( 2
i
Ni   is an 
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individual-specific random effect and ),0( 2 Nit  is a mean zero error term. The model is 
estimated by using the Generalized Least Squares (GLS), and we conduct the same robustness 
tests carried out in Result 1.. The results are reported in Table 5. They show no significant 
difference between ECC and HCV, indicating that for a given cost, endogenizing 
communication has no impact on group emissions. 
 
Table 5: Regression explaining group emissions by same cost communication treatments 
(ECC and HCV) 
 
Variables 
Coefficients 
(p-value)  
 Intercept 
85.78*** 
(0.00) 
HCV 
17.31 
(0.16) 
t 
0.442 
(0.63) 
N obs. 128 
Overall R² 0.12 
 
Notes: *** denotes that parameter estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level, ** at the 5% level. p-values 
are in parentheses. Various robustness tests were carried out and confirmed these results. 
 
We then run an additional analysis. We consider model (12), in which we add two interaction 
terms between treatment variables, LCVit and HCVit, and variable Comit, which is equal to 1 
when the group actually communicates and 0 otherwise: 
.*
*
76
543210
itiitit
ititititititit
tComLCV
ComHCVHCVLCVECCCTE




  (14) 
The model is estimated by using the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) and the same 
robustness tests as in Result 1 are carried out. The results are presented in Table 6. It reveals 
that LCV and HCV are not significant. This shows that group emissions are not significantly 
reduced with respect to treatment NC when communication is not favored by vote in the 
group. In contrast, the interaction terms are significant, showing that whenever 
communication is actually favored by vote, group emissions do decrease with respect to the 
case where communication is not favored by vote. The global effects on group emissions in 
groups that communicate compared to the NC treatment are given by LCV+LCV*Com and 
HCV+HCV*Com, which are respectively -27.78 (p = 0.03) and -35.37 (p = 0.00), which 
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should be compared to the effect of CT, -25.43 (p = 0.03). This proves that in groups that 
actually communicate, group emissions are at least as reduced as in the Cheap Talk treatment, 
despite the cost of communication. Although the effect of HCV*Com appears to be very 
large, one should note that in this treatment, communication is favored by vote in one group 
and only one time (see Table 7). This result should therefore be taken with precaution. 
 
Table 6: Regression explaining group emissions by treatment and communication phase 
variables 
 
Variables 
Coefficients 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
100.4*** 
(0.00) 
CT 
-25.43** 
(0.03) 
ECC 
-18.80 
(0.19) 
LCV 
-13.12 
(0.39) 
LCV * Com 
-14.67*** 
(0.01) 
HCV 
0.775 
(0.95) 
HCV * Com 
-36.15*** 
(0.00) 
t 
0.779* 
(0.05) 
N obs. 384    
Overall R² 0.24 
Notes: *** denotes that parameter estimate is statistically significant at the 1% level. p-values are in parentheses. 
Various robustness tests were carried out and confirmed these results. 
 
3.2 Endogenous Costly Communication 
 
To summarize, endogenous costly communication has no significant impact on group 
emissions when communication is not favoured by vote. However, whenever communication 
actually takes place, endogenous costly communication significantly reduces group emissions. 
We now examine the impact of the cost on the probability of voting for a communication 
phase. In all this section, we focus our analysis on the two endogenous communication 
treatments: LCV and HCV.  
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Result 3: A higher cost of communication deteriorates the individual probability to vote 
for a communication phase.  
 
Tables 7 and 8 indicate respectively the number of subjects who voted for 
communication in HCV and LCV. Subjects communicate more in LCV than in HCV. 8 
communication phases took place in LCV against only 1 in HCV (over 16 opportunities to 
communicate, i.e. 4 groups * 4 voting phases). The low number of communication phases 
observed in LCV and HCV is consistent with the studies on costly endogenous 
communication. Indeed, Isaac and Walker (1991) showed that subjects rarely vote for 
communication. They suggest that the refusal to communicate could be due to a relatively 
high cost.
6
 Similarly, Kriss et al. (2011) investigated the impact of costly communication in a 
coordination game, and found that subjects choose not to communicate due to the free-riding 
on the communication cost even for low costs. Substantial efforts are undertaken in order to 
avoid incurring the communication costs. 
 
Table 7: Number of subjects who voted for a communication phase in the HCV treatment 
 
Vote before period 
Groups 
5
th
 9
th
 13
th
 17
th
 
Group 1 2 4 5* 0 
Group 2 2 1 1 1 
Group 3 2 1 1 2 
Group 4 4 2 3 4 
 
Table 8: Number of subjects who voted for a communication phase in the LCV treatment 
 
Vote before period 
Groups 
5
th
 9
th
 13
th
 17
th
 
Group 1 5* 5* 1 3 
Group 2 5* 4 5* 2 
Group 3 5* 4 5* 0 
Group 4 5* 3 6* 2 
 
(*): The vote led to a communication phase. 
 
In order to substantiate the previous descriptive analysis, we estimate the determinants 
of subjects’ vote for the communication phase. As previously, the observations can be treated 
as cross-sectional time series (or panel) data. However, this time, we work at the subject level 
                                                 
6
 In their study, another explanation could be due to the fact that the cost of communication is not refunded if 
communication is not favored by vote. 
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and consider only the 4 voting phases (that is, just before periods 5, 9, 13, 17). There are 64 
subjects (2 treatments (LCV and HCV) * 4 groups * 8 subjects). Assume that subject i’s (i = 
1, …, 64) probability of voting for the communication phase in periods t (= 5, 9, 13, 17) is 
given by: 
itiitit xy  
*
,  (15) 
where 
*
ity  is a latent variable representing subject i’s utility level at period t, xit is a (k × 1) 
vector of k explanatory variables,  is the (k × 1) regression vector to be estimated, it  and 
it  have the same role as in the previous models. We assume that if 
*
ity  ≤ 0, then the subject 
votes against the communication phase and if 
*
ity  > 0, then the subject votes for it. We define 
the binary observed variable yit, which is equal to 0 when 
*
ity  ≤ 0 and to 1 if 
*
ity  > 0. The 
model assumes that prob(yit=0 / xit) = prob(
*
ity ≤0 / xit) = F(− itx ) and 
p(yit=1 / xit) = p(
*
ity >0 / xit) = 1−F(− itx ), where F(.) is the cumulative normal distribution. 
We consider the following panel probit model with random eﬀects: 
ititiitit tEHCVy    31,1210
*
,  (16) 
where Ei-1,t-1 is the sum of the emissions of the other group members in the period just before 
the voting phase, which is likely to have an impact on voting behavior. We carried out 
robustness tests (Bootstrap, Jackknife), and also checked that a logit and a hierarchical model 
specifications yield similar results. The results of the maximum likelihood estimation of are 
displayed in Table 9. 
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Table 9: Probit regression on panel data with random effects explaining the individual 
probability of voting for a communication phase 
 
Variables 
Coefficients 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
-1.380** 
(0.02) 
HCV 
-1.081*** 
(0.00) 
Emissions of 
others in t-1 
0.0252*** 
(0.00) 
t 
-0.06*** 
(0.02) 
Log likelihood -141.05 
N.obs 256 
Notes: LCV is the reference treatment. *** denotes that parameter estimate is statistically significant at the 1% 
level. p-values are in parentheses. Various robustness tests were carried out and confirmed these results. 
 
We observe that HCV is significantly negative, indicating that the cost of communication 
deteriorates subjects’ willingness to vote for it. This provides an explanation for the poor 
performance of endogenous costly communication with respect to cheap talk. Because of the 
cost, communication phases are rare. As a result, subjects’ ability to cooperate is reduced. A 
reason might be that subjects have fewer opportunities to coordinate. Alternatively, 
unwillingness to communicate of other group members may be interpreted as unwillingness to 
cooperate. It should be noticed that the probability of voting for a communication phase is 
also positively related to the sum of other subjects’ emissions in the period before. So, 
subjects are all the more ready to provide efforts to communicate as group emissions become 
larger. Nevertheless, we note that the probability of voting for communication decreases over 
time. Thus, all other things being equal, subjects would be decreasingly willing to vote for 
communication. 
Result 4: The vote reveals the type of the polluter when the cost of communication is 
low. A positive (negative) vote for communication is associated with lower (higher) 
individual emissions level.  
 
We restrict our analysis to treatment LCV because the communication phase was 
adopted only once in one group in treatment HCV. So, there are 32 subjects (4 groups * 8 
subjects). Consider the following model: 
ititiititit tEComVotee    41,13210 ,  (17) 
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where eit subject i’s 32,....,1i  emissions at period 20,...,5t ; Voteit equals 1 if the subject 
voted for the communication phase in the last voting phase (that is, just before periods 5, 9, 
13, and 17); Comit is equal to 1 when a communication phase actually took place in the group 
in the last voting phase, and 0 otherwise; Ei-1,t-1 is the other group members’ sum of emissions 
in the period before (one should keep in mind that variables Voteit and Comit vary every 4 
periods whereas variables Ei-1,t-1 and t vary at every period). The model is estimated by using 
the Generalized Least Squares (GLS) and the same robustness tests as before are carried out. 
We first consider the model without variable Comit, and then with this variable. The results 
are presented in Table 10. 
 
Table 10: Regression explaining individual emissions in the LCV treatment 
 
 
Variables 
Without Com With Com 
Coefficients 
(p-value) 
Coefficients 
(p-value) 
Intercept 
5.785*** 
(0.000) 
8.136*** 
(4.38) 
Vote 
-1.283*** 
(0.000) 
-0.691** 
(-2.22) 
Emissions of 
others in t-1 
0.0713*** 
(0.000) 
0.0606*** 
(7.20) 
t 
0.0324 
(0.720) 
-0.0433 
(-0.37) 
Com -- 
-1.678* 
(-1.79) 
N obs. 512 512    
Overall R² 0.22 0.24 
Notes: LCV is the reference treatment. *** denotes that parameter estimate is statistically significant at the 1% 
level; ** at the 5% level. p-values are in parentheses. Various robustness tests were carried out and confirmed 
these results. 
 
 Considering first the results of model without the variable Com, we observe that the 
subject’s vote is negatively related to his emission. Thus, a subject voting for communication 
emits less in the following periods while a subject voting against communication emits more 
on average. Therefore, voting for communication can be interpreted as an expression of the 
willingness to cooperate. This result was not self-evident. Indeed, a subject voting for 
communication might update his plan once he observes the result of the voting phase. To test 
the robustness of this result, we run the model with Com, which includes the result of the 
voting phase. We find that the individual vote remains significantly negative. Hence, the fact 
that the individual vote reveals behavior remains true even after controlling for the output of 
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the voting phase. Finally, it can be noticed that individual emissions are increasing with the 
sum of others’ emissions at the period before, which is a form of reciprocity. 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
We tested the efficiency of the Average Pigovian Tax (APT) first proposed by Suter et al. 
(2008) to regulate the phenomena of nonpoint source pollution. The choice of this instrument 
from the set of ambient-based tax mechanisms is justified by the fact that it is less severe and 
therefore more politically feasible. Contrary to the standard ambient tax, the efficiency of the 
APT requires cooperation. To facilitate cooperation, Suter et al. (2008) have suggested 
costless non-binding communication or cheap talk. However, in considering the experimental 
circumstances in which communication solves cooperation problems, one must remember that 
the costless communication used in the experiment of Suter et al. (2008) to obtain high rates 
of efficiency is very unlikely to exist outside the laboratory setting. Thus, in order to mimic 
that real-world communication often imposes costs on those who are involved in it, we 
consider in this experiment costly communication. 
We confirmed that with cheap talk the APT instrument induces polluters to reduce their 
emissions. However, we found that the reduction of group emissions is less important when 
communication is costly even when we endogenize communication by introducing a voting 
phase. In addition, a variation of the cost when communication is endogenous revealed that a 
drastic drop of the cost does not provoke a significant reduction of group emissions. A more 
specific analysis of the performance of the APT instrument under endogenous communication 
reveals that these findings have to be nuanced. First, we observed that in groups where 
communication is actually voted, emissions are reduced at the same level as under the cheap 
talk treatment. However, one should keep in mind that communication is in fact rarely voted. 
Second, we noticed that subjects’ voting behavior is very sensitive to the cost. In other words, 
a larger cost deteriorates the probability of voting for communication. This explains why 
communication was rarely favored by vote when it was costly. In contrast, a lower cost not 
only increases the likelihood of voting for communication, but also prompts the polluter into 
revealing his type, as a positive vote for communication is associated with lower emission, 
whereas a negative vote is associated with higher emission. This result implies that the vote 
might be an indicator to differentiate between the cooperative agents and the non-cooperative 
ones.  
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To summarize, our study shows that the APT may be an interesting compromise for dealing 
with the major concerns of nonpoint source pollution. The APT may allow addressing the 
challenges of pollution reduction and political acceptability raised by the ambient tax 
mechanisms. We emphasized that the role of communication is crucial in enhancing the 
performance of the instrument. Our results suggest that when communication imposes any 
cost, the ambient-based policy will be less effective than in a situation where communication 
is essentially free. Specifically, the regulator should pay attention to the cost borne by 
polluters to implement communication. Further investigations are required to identify the 
other potential factors that are likely to impact the ability of polluters to communicate with 
one another.  
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Appendix 1: Instructions 
 
These are the translated instructions for treatment HCV. The instructions for the other 
treatments are available upon request. 
 
Welcome 
 
Introduction 
You will participate in an experiment whose objective is to study individual and group 
decision-making. 
Before starting the experiment, we will ask you some questions to verify your understanding 
of the instructions. After we finish reading the instructions, you can ask us any question you 
may have. 
 
16 people, randomly divided into two groups of eight, are involved in this experience. So you 
are a member of one of these two groups of eight members. During the experience you will 
interact anonymously with the members of your own group. 
The gains you realize depend both on your own decisions and on the decisions taken by the 
other members of your group. These gains will be recorded in points and converted into euros 
at the end of the experiment. 
This experience consists of at least 22 periods. The following instructions will inform you on 
how your gain at each period will be calculated. They also will explain the chronology of the 
experience. 
1. Your decision 
At the beginning of each period, each member of your group, including yourself, has 20 
tokens. Your task consists in investing an integer number of tokens between 0 and 20. Your 
earnings depend on the number of tokens invested by yourself and the other seven members 
of the group. It is possible that you will win nothing, and worse even, you can lose points. 
 
The gain (or loss) you realize at each period consists of two parts:  
- A gain that depends on your own investment. 
- A loss that depends on both your investment and those of the seven other members of your 
group. 
In addition, every 4 periods, you may also bear an extra cost if you vote for having a 
discussion with the other group members. 
 28 
 
1.1. The gain due to your own investment 
Each token you invest brings you a certain number of points, as shown in the Table below. It 
is composed of three columns. They respectively indicate the number of tokens you wish to 
invest, the additional earnings generated by the investment of your last token and your overall 
earnings. 
- If you invest 0 token, your gain is 500 points 
- If you invest 1 point, your gain is 582 points (500 +82) 
- If you invest 2 tokens, your gain is 660 points (500 +82 +78) 
The same principle is applied up to 20 tokens: 
      -   If you invest 20 tokens, your gain is 1380 points (500 + 78 + 82 ... + 14 +10 +6 = 
1380). 
Tokens Earnings  (in points) Additional earnings  generated by the last token 
0 500 - 
1 582 82 
2 660 78 
3 734 74 
4 804 70 
5 870 66 
6 932 62 
7 990 58 
8 1044 54 
9 1094 50 
10 1140 46 
11 1182 42 
12 1220 38 
13 1254 34 
14 1284 30 
15 1310 26 
16 1332 22 
17 1350 18 
18 1364 14 
19 1374 10 
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20 1380 6 
 
You will notice that the more tokens you invest, the less points each of them generates. The 
un-invested tokens are lost. You can not reuse them in the following periods. 
Example: If you invest 9 tokens in one period, you will not have 31 tokens in the next period 
but 20. 
1.2. The loss due to the group investment (your investment and those of your group-
members) 
Each member of your group, including yourself, incurs a loss if the total number of invested 
tokens is greater than 64. If the total number of tokens invested by your group is larger than 
64, everyone loses 6.5 times the difference between the total number of tokens invested by 
your group and 64. 
Example: The total number of tokens invested by your group is 100 tokens. This number is 
greater than 64 so each member of the group, including yourself, loses 234 points ((100-64 
)*6.5). 
In summary, the loss depends on the total number of tokens invested by the group. If it is 
larger than 64, each member of the group incurs a similar loss. The more the number of 
tokens invested are further from 64, the greater the loss is. 
 
2. The cost due to your participation in the discussion session 
You have the opportunity to communicate with your other group-members before the 5
th
, 9
th
, 
13
th
, 17
th
 and 21
st
   periods. At each of these periods, you indicate by a vote whether you want 
to discuss with them (“yes” or “no”). The question “Would you like to discuss with the other 
members of your group?” appears on your screen. If the majority of the group (at least 5 
“yes”) wishes to discuss, a chat room will appear and all members of the group, including 
those who responded "no” can then engage in a discussion phase. Otherwise no discussion 
will take place. 
- If you voted “yes”, 200 points will be deducted from your earnings at the end of this 
period, but only if there is a discussion. 
- If you voted “no”, no points will be deducted from your earnings at the end of that 
period whether or not there is a discussion. 
After the vote, you will be informed of the holding or not of a discussion session. However, 
the voting score (how many “yes”" and “no”) will not be indicated. 
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During the discussion phases, limited to three minutes, agreements to share gains after the 
experiment are prohibited. Apart from the discussion time allowed, it is forbidden to 
communicate during the experiment. 
 
3. Chronology of the experience 
In each period, the computer asks you to enter the number of tokens you want to invest. You 
can enter any integer number between 0 and 20. The other members of your group do the 
same task on their side, but you do not observe their individual decisions. You will just know 
the total sum of their individual decisions at the end of a period. Once all members of your 
group have made their decisions, the computer calculates the gain or loss for that period. Then 
it provides each participant with the total number of tokens invested by the seven other 
members of the group and its gain for the period. The next period begins when all members of 
your group are ready. At any time, you can view the history of experience. It reminds you for 
each historical period, your decision, the total number of tokens made by the other seven 
members of the group and your gain. 
At the end of the experiment, your gain will be converted into Euros. The conversion rate to 
be applied is 1000 points equal to € 1. 
Before starting the experiment, you will participate in a trial period. The aim is to enable you 
to familiarize yourself with the user interface of the computer. During this trial period the 
computer will play the role of the other seven people, assuming that they invest 70 tokens. 
The earnings received during this period will not be converted into euros. 
 
 
